The Politicisation of the European Central Bank and the Bundestag by Högenauer, Anna-Lena
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 291–302
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v7i3.2214
Article
The Politicisation of the European Central Bank and the Bundestag
Anna-Lena Högenauer
Institute of Political Science, University of Luxembourg, 4366 Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg;
E-mail: anna-lena.hoegenauer@uni.lu
Submitted: 6 May 2019 | Accepted: 25 June 2019 | Published: 27 September 2019
Abstract
The European Central Bank (ECB) became one of the key actors during the Eurozone crisis. However, its prominent role
was not without controversy. On one hand, the Eurozone was stabilised, no member state defaulted, and no state had
to leave the Euro. On the other hand, the ECB had to stretch its mandate, expand its policy remit, and adopt so-called
‘unconventional’ monetary policies. These attempts to depoliticise political challenges through a technocratic approach
reduced the opportunities for democratic contestation, but they also bred frustration that led to politicisation. This article
studies to what extent this politicisation affected the perception of the ECB in national parliaments. For this purpose, it
studies the extent to which ECB policy has become politicised in the German Bundestag through an analysis of plenary
debates from 2005 to 2018. The Bundestag represents an unlikely case for politicisation despite wide-spread criticism of
the ECB in the media, as Germany was traditionally attached to creating a highly independent ECB, until recently had no
major Eurosceptic right-wing parties, and parliamentary scrutiny of the national central bank is low. However, by studying
the salience of ECB policies, the polarisation of opinion in the parliament, as well as the range of actors participating in the
debates, this article finds that the ECB’s policies have become politicised and the subject of scrutiny and dissatisfaction.
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1. Introduction
As the EU has been shaken by multiple crises in the last
15 years,more andmore aspects of it have becomepoliti-
cised. The European Central Bank (ECB) was one insti-
tution whose policies proved controversial despite the
technocratic nature of central banking. The ECB filled a
vacuum when national governments failed to agree on
a way to tackle high levels of sovereign debt. In the pro-
cess, it became the ‘key actor in the EU’s economic gov-
ernance’ (Fromage & Ibrido, 2018, p. 295). The task of
keeping the Euro stable required it to expand its poli-
cies. As a result, ‘its competences stretched to their lim-
its’ (Fromage & Ibrido, p. 296). However, in this em-
powerment, Scicluna and Auer (2019) see a wider prob-
lem, namely the tendency to resolve political challenges
through a technocratic approach. However, by reducing
the opportunities for regular democratic contestation,
the EU may be fuelling frustration and thus politicisation
and contestation. In addition, with the creation of the
European banking union, the ECB gained new powers in
recent years and now supervises the largest banks under
the Single Supervisory Mechanism. These powers have
now become more salient, as weak banking supervision
is seen as one of the factors contributing to the financial
crisis of 2008.
The problem with technocratic governance is that it
has the potential to pit non-majoritarian actors that are
meant to be independent and apolitical (e.g., the ECB)
against political actors (e.g., parliaments) that feel that
issues that ought to be resolved politically are removed
from their grasp by the former. Studies into the scrutiny
of EU affairs in national parliaments since the crisis have
shown that EU governance, in general, is becomingmore
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salient and controversial among parliamentarians (Auel
& Raunio, 2014; Closa & Maatsch, 2014; Wendler, 2014).
In EU policy-making, there is thus a certain fight emerg-
ing for competencies between non-majoritarian and po-
litical actors, making it particularly interesting to inves-
tigate the extent to which parliaments have tried to ex-
tend their scrutiny of the ECB and whether this has led
to politicisation.
The question of whether ECB policy has become
politicised in the German parliament, the Bundestag, is
particularly important in this context. The German case
is important due to the political and economic weight
of the country in the Eurozone. Also, the German par-
liament is not a likely case for politicisation. Of course,
the ECB’s Eurozone crisis policies did not resonate well
with the German public and media, providing an in-
centive to scrutinise the ECB. There were, in partic-
ular, wide-spread fears about the negative impact of
low interest rates on savers and the fear that TARGET2
(Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement
Express Transfer System) imbalances, the bail-out pro-
grammes, the ECB’s quantitative easing1 measures, and
the banking union would create a ‘transfer union’. In ad-
dition, the Bundestag has fairly strong scrutiny powers
in EU affairs in general (Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2014),
and particularly with regard to specific Eurozone crisis
policies. The German parliament, the Bundestag, has ex-
tensive oversight and veto powers over the European
Financial Stability Fund, for example (Höing, 2013).
Moschella also emphasizes that the Bundestag is the
only Eurozone parliament that has both ex-ante and ex-
post scrutiny powers over lending programmes that af-
fect the German budget (Moschella, 2017). Finally, Auel
and Höing (2014) show that the Bundestag is one of the
more active debaters of crisis policies.
On the other hand, while the Bundestag has consid-
erable scrutiny powers over EU affairs in general and cri-
sis policies in particular, neither the European nor the
German legal framework provide it with formal scrutiny
powers over the ECB. It can, of course, debate ECB policy,
but it has no formal means of influence nor can it sum-
mon ECB representatives. As an extremely independent
central bank, the ECB is protected against undue political
influence, which also means that formal parliamentary
powers of oversight are extremely weak—even with re-
gard to the European Parliament (EP). Furthermore, the
German parliament has no tradition of actively scrutin-
ising central banks. The Bundesbank was already inde-
pendent before the Euro was created, and recent stud-
ies show that the Bundestag is barely scrutinizing the
Bundesbank due to how strictly it respects its indepen-
dence (Högenauer & Howarth, 2018). Högenauer and
Howarth (2018) show that the Bundesbank was only
mentioned in 12 debates in a 3-year period, and then
only in 1–2 speeches per debate. One would, therefore,
also expect parliamentary scrutiny of the ECB to be low in
Germany, as the ECBwas created as a highly independent
central bank on the insistence of Germany and based on
themodel of the Bundesbank. In addition, Wonka (2016)
argues that Germany is an unlikely case for politicisation
of EU affairs in general because the public and elites are
broadly pro-European and anti-European right-wing par-
ties were not yet represented in the Bundestag during
the early crisis years. Thus, if the Bundestag were to in-
creasingly debate ECB policy, it would be a very strong
indication of the politicisation of a policy area that—in
the German case—was traditionally barely scrutinized.
This article aims to analyse through the case of
the German Bundestag whether ECB policy has be-
come politicized in the course of the Eurozone cri-
sis. Politicisation will be analysed through three dimen-
sions, based on the framework developed by De Wilde,
Leupold and Schmidtke (2016): the salience of the pol-
icy, the polarisation it triggers, and the range of actors
involved in the debate.
2. A Brief Overview over the ECB’s Policies since the
Financial Crisis
When the financial crisis first erupted in 2007/2008,
the ECB’s response was initially muted. Unlike the US
Federal Reserve, which lowered interest rates to stimu-
late the economy, the ECB initially maintained and even
increased the interest rate to stave off inflation. It was
only in late 2009 that the ECB also rapidly lowered the
interest rate when faced with the threat of an economic
recession, from 3.25 per cent in October 2008 to 0.25
per cent in April 2009 (ECB, n.d.). The monetary policy of
the ECB then became increasingly expansionary as the
Eurozone crisis took hold.
Over time, the ECB deployed both ‘conventional’ and
‘unconventional’ policies to stabilize the Eurozone. As
part of its conventional policies, the ECB continued its
low interest rate policy. In 2014, it decided to impose a
negative interest rate on deposits at the ECB: This means
that banks that ‘parked’ liquidity at the ECB no longer re-
ceived interest, but had to pay interest to the ECB. The
goal was to prevent the credit market from drying up
by encouraging banks to invest in the economy instead.
In addition, the ECB lowered the base interest rate to
zero per cent in 2016. More controversially, it moved to-
wards fixed-rate full allotment in 2008, i.e., it agreed to
provide unlimited credit to banks at a fixed interest rate
(Flachmeyer & Paul, 2018).
In addition, the ECB used so-called ‘unconventional’
policies that were not part of its standard approach
to monetary policy. One of these was the provision of
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) that allowed cen-
tral banks to provide solvent banks with liquidity in re-
turn for relatively low securities. This measure played a
1 ‘Quantitative easing‘ refers to the increase in the money supply (liquidity) by a central bank. In this case, for example, the ECB purchases sovereign
bonds from the market and thereby releases money into the market in the hope that this injection of liquidity will encourage lending and investment
and ultimately stimulate economic activity.
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 3, Pages 291–302 292
role in the management of the Greek crisis, for exam-
ple. A series of new bond-buying programmes allowed
the ECB to purchase bonds, and particularly sovereign
debt, on the secondary markets. What started with
the 2010–2012 Security Markets Programme (SMP), led
to the announcement of an outright monetary trans-
actions (OMT) programme in 2012, when the ECB de-
clared that it would do ‘whatever it takes’ to stabi-
lize the Euro. The OMT never had to be put in prac-
tice, as the announcement itself reassured markets suf-
ficiently to bring down the interest rates on sovereign
debt (Högenauer & Howarth, 2019). Finally, in 2015 the
Expanded Assets purchase programme was introduced.
The goal of these policies was to increase inflation when
it was close to zero per cent and to stimulate the econ-
omy. At its height (2016 to early 2017), the ECB bought
bonds worth 80 billion Euro per month on average. After
March 2017, the volumes were progressively reduced
(Flachmeyer & Paul, 2018).
The ECBwas also amember in the ‘Troika’, a decision-
making group consisting of the ECB, the Commission, and
the InternationalMonetary Fund. The Troika played a role
in the bail-outs of Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, and Portugal
by requesting austerity measures and reforms in return
for financial support. It was controversial that a non-
majoritarian, technocratic institution such as the ECB
should impose conditions on elected governments that
would have important repercussions on their citizens.
In 2012, EU policy-makers decided to create a bank-
ing union with the ECB as chief supervisor over large
Eurozone banks. For the ECB, the advantagewas that this
removed information asymmetries and allowed it to ex-
tend liquidity to solvent banks only. Previously, it had to
rely on the national supervisory bodies for information.
However, the drawback was that being both a lender to
banks and a supervisor of banks created a permanent risk
of a conflict of interest, and raised questions about the
ECB’s ability to separate these functions in-house.
Many of these policies would have been unthink-
able before the crisis, and the effect of the emergency
credits, punitive interests, and bond-buying programmes
was heightened controversy (Flachmeyer & Paul, 2018).
Similarly, it would have been inconceivable that the ECB
would instructmember state governments to pursue spe-
cific economic and fiscal policies. Thus, overall, the ECB
was, on the one hand, a key actor in the crisis, and at
times the only one who could act in the face of stale-
mate in the EU’s political institutions (Flachmeyer & Paul,
2018). But on the other hand, its policies had increas-
ingly noticeable redistributive effects (Goodhart& Lastra,
2018), stretched the mandate defined in the Treaty and
led to a rise in the level of public distrust of the ECB
(Tesche, 2018).
3. The ECB and Parliaments
As the ECB’s role in the crisis was very prominent, it
is difficult to conceive these policies as purely techno-
cratic decisions that can be legitimized in terms of out-
put legitimacy. The fact that the effects of ECB policy
on different groups of citizens became visible and often
involved a trade-off between different interests means
that output legitimacy would mean different things to
different people (Goodhart & Lastra, 2018). In addition,
the problemwith this type of technocratic policy-making
is that it shifts power away from majoritarian and demo-
cratically legitimized institutions to technocratic and non-
majoritarian institutions that are not electorally account-
able. Börzel and Risse (2018, p. 83) estimate that this ap-
proach breeds dissatisfaction, and that ‘we have to con-
sider that depolitisation through supranational delega-
tion during the Euro crisis has ultimately led tomore, not
less politicisation.’
The political impact of the crisis policies can also
be felt in the case of Germany. While 65 per cent of
Germans trusted the ECB prior to the crisis in spring
2007, by 2009 this had already shrunk to 52 per cent
(European Commission, 2007, 2009). Trust in the EU
also plummetedduring the crisis (Wonka, 2016). Leupold
(2016) finds that the number of German press articles
on EMU nearly doubled in 2010/2011 compared to 2007
and that the ECB’s evolving policies triggered strong op-
position in the German media. Heft (2017) also con-
firms that support for financial aid is much lower in the
German press.
The political elite also increasingly voiced scepticism
in the media. Quantitative easing was seen as an illegal
attempt to finance the debt of member states, the inter-
est rate was perceived as being artificially low with the
potential to harm savings banks, insurers and savers and
the growing TARGET2 balances betweendebtor and cred-
itor countries were eyed critically. A German CB presi-
dent resigned over disagreementswith the ECB’s policies,
ministers such as Wolfgang Schäuble publicly blamed
the ECB for the rise of right-wing populism in Germany,
and the ECB’s OMT programme was challenged be-
fore the German Constitutional Court (Högenauer &
Howarth, 2019).
In the midst of the crisis, Draghi, therefore, made
an unprecedented visit to the Bundestag on the 25th of
October 2012 to explain the OMT that was heavily crit-
icized by German politicians and the president of the
Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann. About 100 MPs attended
the session, which was targeted at the budget and fi-
nance committees and the European affairs committee
(Wiesmann & Steen, 2012).
Despite this rare visit, national parliaments have vir-
tually no influence over the ECB. This is not just due to
the fact that most national parliaments had had weak
competences in EU affairs until they started to claw
back powers of scrutiny in the 1990s and 2000s (Raunio,
2009; Winzen, 2012). Rather, the fact is that ECB policy-
making is a different beast from ‘ordinary’ EU policy-
making. As both the ECB’smandate and its independence
from political institutions are enshrined in the Treaty,
neither the EP nor the national parliaments are able to
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give it mandates or restrict its actions through legisla-
tion. Nevertheless, there are now two mechanisms that
bring the ECB in contact with parliaments. Firstly, there
is the traditional dialogue with the EP, the Monetary
Dialogue, based on art. 284-3 TFEU since 1998. More re-
cently, since the creation of a European banking union
with the ECB as the supervisory authority, the ECB has
agreed to a ‘Banking Dialogue’ that includes both the EP
and National Parliaments (Amtenbrink & van Duin, 2009;
Fromage & Ibrido, 2018). However, these Dialogues are
purely consultative.
That said, parliaments do have the power to scruti-
nize and debate ECB policy publicly, even if they cannot
directly influence it.Whether they do so andhow they do
so is in a sense a measure of how accepted ECB policy is.
In this context, it is important to note that parliamentary
scrutiny does not necessarily reduce the central bank’s
independence: In fact, if it is used as a tool to encourage
the central bank to explain and justify its actions, it can
facilitate greater transparency and accountability foster-
ing trust between political and technocratic institutions.
However, unlike scrutiny in general, the politicisation of
central banking is arguably problematic. The current set
up of the Eurozone with high a highly independent cen-
tral bank relies on the assumption that the ECB can be a
technocratic and neutral actor that defends the best in-
terest of the whole within a clear mandate, and that the
political institutionswill perceive it as such and allow it to
exercise its powers freely. A high level of politicisation—
i.e., controversy or criticism—of ECB policy in other insti-
tutions can be interpreted as a sign that the trust these
institutions have that the ECB is indeed a technocratic
and neutral defender of the common interestwith a clear
mandate is eroding. After all, technocratic institutions
rely largely on output legitimacy—but is it enough if the
institution itself claims that it produces good outcomes,
or if experts confirm that the output is good, or does out-
put legitimacy not also require the recognition of other
institutions as well as the public, i.e., broad agreement
that the output is indeed good? If high politicisation con-
tinued over a longer term, one would eventually have to
question whether such a high formal degree of ECB inde-
pendence was in practice feasible and in general desir-
able from a democratic perspective.
In the following sections, the article will explore to
what extent there has been politicisation and how it
has evolved over time. In addition, it tests a number
of hypotheses. Firstly, De Wilde et al. (2016) argue that
the politicisation of EU governance is driven by the crit-
ics of the EU rather than its supporters. This would as-
sume that the presence of strong critical voices pushes or
keeps an issue on the agenda and that high levels of criti-
cism will lead to more salience, i.e., more active scrutiny.
If this holds true, the politicisation of ECB policy would
indeed be the sign of a problem.
H1: Higher levels of criticism lead to more salience.
Secondly, Rauh (2014) argues that the salience of EU af-
fairs in the plenary is linked, amongst other things, to
supranational policy output and public visibility. In line
with this, we also expect politicisation to increase after
key ECBdecisions or actions. If it holds true that politicisa-
tion is linked mainly to specific decisions or events, then
politicisation might only be temporary, which means
that disagreements might not cause problems in the
longer term.
H2: Politicisation increases after important ECB deci-
sions or actions.
Thirdly, Degner and Leuffen (2016) find that, in the
Bundestag, government membership and EU support
are the main drivers of votes in favour of fiscal aid for
Euro area member states. ECB policy-making is differ-
ent, in that the German government is not a part of
ECB decisions, whereas it can be held accountable for
its role in the European Council in decisions on fiscal
aid. Nevertheless, we will analyse, whether opposition
parties are indeed more critical of ECB policy, especially
those that are further away from the political centre.
Governments are likely to be concerned that voters do
not always distinguishwho exactly has influence over any
particular policy, and how much influence they actually
have, but may instead tend to blame the state of affairs
on those they perceive to be in charge. Evenwhen voters
are aware that it was another institution that took the de-
cision, they may ask why the government did not inter-
vene. Thus, governments have a certain interest in de-
fending the state-of-affairs in general. Rauh (2014) also
argues that government parties are the main drivers of
scrutiny into EU affairs.
H3: Opposition parties are more critical of ECB policy
than government parties.
H4: Government parties are more active than opposi-
tion parties in ECB scrutiny.
4. Research Design
The aim of the article is to assess how ECB policy has
become politicised in the German Bundestag. De Wilde
et al.’s definition of politicisation as a three-dimensional
process involving increased salience, polarisation of opin-
ion, and the expansion of actors involved in EU issues is
used (De Wilde et al., 2016; cf. De Wilde, 2011; Hutter
& Grande, 2014). For this purpose, we will measure
‘salience’ through the number of plenary sessions in
whichMPs commented on ECB policy, polarisation as the
occupation of more extreme positions over time by the
different parties, and the expansion of actors and an in-
crease in the number of MPs who comment on ECB poli-
cies in a given year.
The article analyses the plenary debates of the 16th,
17th, 18th and beginning of the 19th legislative term of
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the German Bundestag (October 2005 to 31 December
2018). This time span was chosen as it includes years
preceding the financial crisis, the financial crisis itself,
the Eurozone crisis, and the stabilisation of the Eurozone
after the crisis. In addition, the Eurosceptic right-wing
populist Alternative for Germany (AFD) entered the
Bundestag for the first time in 2017. By including the first
years of the 19th parliamentary term, the impact of this
new party can thus be analysed.
The relevant plenary debates were identified by
a search for both the acronym ‘EZB’ and the term
‘Zentralbank’. The resulting body was then manually
coded to establish both the number of plenary sessions
in which at least one MP commented on ECB policy and
the number of speeches byMPs on ECB policy. This diver-
sity of indicators will facilitate comparisons with other
cases by other authors in the future: The number of
speeches alone can be a difficult indicator for compar-
ative studies, as some parliaments allow/have a culture
of many interventions per debate, whereas other parlia-
ments limit the number of speakers (e.g., to one expert
per party). In the case of the Bundestag, there were sev-
eral large debates where many speakers per party inter-
vened, but also a range of smaller ones where most par-
ties had one or two speakers, and only a few parties had
more—presumably either because of a particular inter-
est on the part of the party or its MPs. However, authors
who work on parliaments with a more restrictive format
of debates may find the number of sessions more repre-
sentative/comparable than the number of speeches.
During data collection, documents were removed (or
speeches skipped), only if the government mentioned
the ECB or if the document or speech was not found to
be relevant for an assessment of ‘politicisation’: This in-
cludes, for example, cases where MPs referred merely
to ECB data or statistics, mentioned that the ECB was
at a meeting, or explained a technical process involving
the ECB. These statements are not about ‘ECB policy’.
Speeches and sessions were only considered relevant if
at least one sentence made a positive, negative, or neu-
tral statement about an attitude, action, or decision of
the ECB. The result is two sets of data: 212 plenary ses-
sions and 309 speeches.
5. Data Analysis
De Wilde et al. (2016) identified the salience of a pol-
icy as the first dimension of politicisation. The evolution
of the number of plenary sessions in the Bundestag in
which at least one MP commented on the ECB’s poli-
cies does show that the ECB gained political salience at
certain points in time. However, this was not a linear
process. Instead, in line with our expectations (H2), the
salience came and went in waves that broadly reflect
moments where the ECB played a particularly important
role, gained new powers, or took controversial decisions.
The only exception is the third and most recent wave of
politicisation, which is driven primarily by party politics
and the changing composition of theGerman parliament.
The evolution of the number of speeches on ECB policy
broadly mirrors this trend (Figure 1).
If the data on salience in Figure 1 is placed in the con-
text of the changing content of the speeches over time,
the fact that the first two waves are linked to certain
ECB decisions, whereas the third wave is not, becomes
visible: Thus, in 2005 and 2006, when the ECB was not
confronted with any particularly difficult challenges, at-
tention to the ECB was low, which is what one would
Figure 1. The number of speeches and plenary sessions on ECB policy over time.
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expect in the case of an institution that is supposed to
be technocratic and independent. As parliaments have
to cover a broad range of issues in a limited amount of
time, they can be expected to focus primarily on policies
where they can and should make a difference (e.g., legis-
late or mandate) or issues that are important in the eyes
of voters. With the financial crisis of 2008, the visibility
of central banks increased, as the US Federal Reserve de-
cided to lower the interest rate to support the economy,
whereas the ECB chose to maintain a high interest rate.
In this period, the ECB’s decision to prioritize price sta-
bility (low inflation) over growth in line with its mandate
in the Treaties was generally praised in the Bundestag. It
was mainly the extreme left (Die Linke) that voiced dis-
satisfaction and the view that the ECB should focus on
growth and jobs.
The attention then dropped again in 2009, although
this is disguised in the data by the fact that there was
one larger debate in which MPs voiced their frustra-
tion that the lowering of the interest rate by the ECB
was not reflected in lower interest on loans for con-
sumers. In 2010, it became clear that the financial cri-
sis was morphing into a substantial sovereign debt cri-
sis for several Eurozone states. As a result, speeches fo-
cused on the ECB’s position on the Greek debt crisis and
also on the question whether the ECB’s bond-buying pro-
grammes (e.g., the Covered Bond Purchase Programme
from May 2009 and the SMP that led the ECB to buy
sovereign bonds issued by crisis countries) could compro-
mise its independence.
The attention rose sharply in 2011 and 2012 remain-
ing relatively high until 2015. In 2011, the speeches over-
whelmingly focused on the legality and potential effects
of the ECB’s bond-buying. There were widespread con-
cerns that this would lead to a communitarisation of
debt, and that the German taxpayer would ultimately
have to pay if one of those states defaulted. The lan-
guage used to discuss the ECB became openly critical,
and the ECB was repeatedly described as turning into a
‘bad bank’. There were also some speeches on the ECB’s
role in the Troika, especially during the last quarter in
the context of negotiations with Greece. The ECB’s poli-
cies on increased liquidity (bond-buying, but also long
term refinancing operations) remained the predominant
theme in the first half of 2012 after the ECB took var-
ious measures to increase liquidity in late 2011/early
2012. However, therewere also sporadic speeches about
banking union in the context of the nascent European
discussions. After the ECB’s OMT announcement in the
summer of 2012, the second half of the year contin-
ued to be dominated by these debates, but now about
one third of the speeches focused on whether the ECB
would be a good banking supervisor as the European
Commission presented legislative proposals on banking
union in September 2012. In the first quarter of 2013,
the individual speeches started to focusmore broadly on
ECB crisis policies, including a range of measures from
bond-buying to low interest rates to Troika decisions.
However, ELA to Cyprus was also becoming an issue of
concern. The second quarter of 2013 was dominated by
speeches about banking union in the context of EU law-
making (several Council Regulations on banking union
are adopted in October 2013). After a short lull in the sec-
ond half of 2013 and the first quarter of 2014, the atten-
tion picked up again and became roughly evenly divided
between ECB crises policies in general, ongoing concerns
about the wisdom of making the ECB banking supervisor
and concerns about low interest rates in the context of
the ECB’s foray into negative interest rates in June 2014.
The case about the legality of the OMT programme be-
fore the European Court of Justice in October 2014 did
not directly influence the debates. In 2015, low interest
rates were the main concern, but there were also a num-
ber of speeches on the ECB’s crisis policies more gener-
ally, and some speeches about the ECB’s role in the Troika
and the Greek crisis. The ECB’s handling of Italian banks
raised some concerns about a potential conflict of inter-
est between its role as a central bank and its role as a
banking supervisor.
After almost no attention was paid to ECB policy in
2016 (when the crisis has become less pressing), there
were a few speeches in early 2017 thatmainly focused on
the ECB’s low interest policy, and then the debate only re-
sumed in late 2017 after the elections to the Bundestag.
In the last quarter of 2017 throughout 2018 interest in
ECB policy picked up again, but it was not driven by ECB
decisions. The issues that were being debated had on-
going relevance of course (e.g., the interests were still
low; the ECB still bought/held high volumes of bonds; the
ECB still held sovereign bonds of countries that might at
some point default; the potential conflict of interest be-
tween central bank and banking supervision tasks had
not changed; the TARGET system was still showing large
imbalances across countries). However, there are no ECB-
related events or decisions that can explainwhy the inter-
est in so high in 2018, and yet so low in 2016 andmost of
2017 (when all of the above were equally true). Rather,
what changed is that a new party, the AFD, entered the
Bundestag for the first time and scepticism of the ECB’s
policieswas an important part of its agenda. This is also il-
lustrated by Figure 2, which shows that, in the 19th term,
the AFD is the source of roughly half of the comments on
the ECB.
In general, the data on the speeches per party group
do not confirm Rauh’s (2014) argument that govern-
ment parties drive EU issues in the Bundestag (H4).
Between 2005–2009 (Christian Democratic Union–Social
Democratic Party of Germany [CDU–SPD] coalition), all
parties were similarly active, with the exception of the
Greens who generally have a lower interest in this is-
sue. In the 17th term (2009–2013), the governing CDU
and Free Democratic Party (FDP) were somewhat less ac-
tive than the opposition. Only from 2013-2017 were the
governing parties (CDU and SPD) noticeably more active
than the opposition, but this may also have been due to
the fact that they were the biggest parties. Finally, since
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Figure 2. The number of speeches on ECB policy per party per parliamentary term.
2017 (CDU–SPD coalition), the AFD stand out as being
the sole driver of ECB scrutiny.
Thus, having established that therewere threewaves
in which the salience of the ECB increased and that
this may now have become a long-term trend with a
Eurosceptic party in parliament, the question is whether
the second criteria—polarisation of opinion—is also
present. For this purpose, Figure 3 shows the average po-
sition taken by each of the parties during each legislative
term. A positive score reflects praise, a negative score
criticism (with the maximum values being 1 and −1).
First of all, the data largely confirm the hypothesis
that government parties tend to be more supportive of
ECB policies (H3). The governing CDU was generally rel-
atively favourable or neutral towards the ECB. The SPD
was also either neutral or positive in its views when it
Figure 3. The parties’ positions on the ECB. Notes: The positions are measured on a 3 point scale: 1 = praise, 0 = neutral,
−1 = criticism. The chart represents the average position per party in each legislative term.
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was in government after 2005 and 2013, and the FDP
was no more sceptical than the other parties after 2009.
In addition, the further opposition parties are from the
middle of the political spectrum, the more critical they
are of the ECB. This holds true for both Die Linke and the
AFD. The one outlier is the Greens. This might be related
to the fact that they are generally the least active party,
and that ECB policy is not an important theme for them.
Figure 3 at best partially supports De Wilde et al.’s
(2016) second element of politicisation, namely the as-
sumption that politicisation comes with increased polar-
isation. As we saw previously, there were three waves of
increased salience: a small wave during the 16th term
(2008); a long and intense one during the 17th term
(2011–2013), which continued on into the 18th term (un-
til mid-2015); followed by a new intense wave in the
19th term. Two elements of the figure are striking: Firstly,
the most intense moment of debate (17th term) is the
term in which party positions converge the most. By
contrast, the 16th parliamentary term (2005–2009), in
which the ECB was far less salient a topic, had almost
as much polarization as the current 19th term, when
a Eurosceptic party entered the Bundestag. Does this
mean that there is no clear pattern of politicisation? Or
does itmean that polarisation is not the best or onlymea-
sure of politicisation?
In fact, a closer look at the figure shows that an alter-
native measure of politicisation could be whether a par-
liament feels critical towards an actor or a policy. Thus,
in this case, the high degree of polarisation before 2009
stems from the fact that most parties praised the ECB
or were neutral, but one party (Die Linke) was scepti-
cal as it considered that the ECB should have prioritized
growth and jobs over price stability. The convergence
between 2009 and 2013, on the other hand, stemmed
from the fact that support for the ECB was in freefall.
The CDU/CSU faction, which was almost fully supporting
ECB policy before 2009, was by that point onlymarginally
favourable with the average position dropping by 0.88
points (on a 2-point scale!). The average position of the
FDP dropped by a full point from very supportive to fairly
critical. All the other parties were also predominantly
critical of the ECB. Only Die Linke experienced a positive
trend and became somewhat less critical. Overall, this
convergence on a critical stance is clearly also a form of
politicisation, especially in combination with the higher
salience of the topic.
That said, one could argue that polarization does not
have to be limited to a growing chasm between sup-
porters and opponents of a policy or institutions. Critical
statements that contradict each other could also be a
form of polarization. In this case, however, the substance
of the speeches also fails to show polarization. Of course,
the convergence on a critical stance does not amount
to a complete absence of disagreement between par-
ties. One of the few fundamental differences is that Die
Linke, for example, also tended to criticize the ECB for
its role in the Troika, whereas the other parties focused
predominantly on its bond-buying programmes, the low
securities it accepted during the crisis, and the impact of
the low interest policy on German savers and the hous-
ing market. There is thus one substantive difference be-
tween the line of argument of this party and the ap-
proach of other parties.
On the other hand, like the other parties, Die Linke
also criticized the impact of the low interest policy on
savers and the housingmarket—and this despite the fact
that it had demanded a more expansionary policy that
prioritized jobs over growth in the 2000s. The same ECB-
policy thus came under attack from both sides—the or-
doliberals who felt that they reduced incentives for nec-
essary structural reforms (and also hurt savers), and the
left, who felt that the ECB’s policies mostly benefitted
banks and otherwise led to an expropriation of German
savers. There were other commonalities, such as the
widespread concern that the ECB’s policy amounted to
a communitarization of debt. On the whole, polarization
thus decreased at the height of the crisis when the parlia-
ment was most active in its scrutiny. It decreased both in
the sense that parties converged around a critical stance
and in the sense that the actual arguments becamemore
similar during this period compared to previous periods
and were sometimes even shared across the whole polit-
ical spectrum (e.g., the perception of the impact of the
low interest policy). The interpretation of the ECB’s pres-
sure on the governments of debtor states was one of the
few areas where the parties disagreed.
From late 2013 onward, the polarisation of opinions
increased again, as some of the parties reconciled them-
selves to the ECB’s policy. After 2017, the polarisation in-
creased further. The landscape had, however, changed:
The FDP, once very favourably disposed towards the ECB,
became a critic of the ECB’s monetary policy, though less
extreme than the new AFD. Die Linke also returned to
a very critical stance, mainly in response to the ECB’s
role in the Troika and the ECB’s perceived lack of sen-
sitivity towards social issues. This is in line with Wonka
(2016) who found that Die Linke was particularly critical
in its opinions on the crisis policies. However, in this case,
other parties also had reservations about the ECB. The
SPD and the Greens, once only moderately pro-ECB, are
now strong supporters, and the CDU, once the biggest
supporter, is less enthusiastic than before the crisis.
It is also interesting to note that the perceptions of
different ECB activities vary. If we take the two biggest
categories of ECB policy—its crisis policies on the one
hand (i.e., interest policy, bond-buying programmes,
Troika…) and its new functions as banking supervisor, we
can see that it is possible for the approval of one type
of ECB policy to increase while approval for the other
falls (cf. Figure 4). In term 17, when the crisis policies
were most negatively perceived, the positive and nega-
tive views on the ECB’s potential role as banking supervi-
sor cancelled each other out. When the MPs reconciled
themselves to the crisis policies, support for the ECB’s
banking supervision conversely dropped. This was due to
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Figure 4. Positions on the crisis policies and the ECB’s role in banking supervision. Notes: The positions are measured on a
3 point scale: 1 = praise, 0 = neutral, −1 = criticism. The chart represents the average position per legislative term.
the fact that MPs saw a conflict of interest in the ECB’s
role as a lender of last resort, its financial stakes in the
survival of some of the problematic Greek and Italian
banks, and its role as a banking supervisor responsible
for declaring whether a bank is indeed still viable.
However, while there were moments where high
salience did indeed coincide with high levels of criticism,
as during the second wave of politicisation (2011–2014),
H1 (that higher levels of criticism lead to higher levels
of salience) is overly simplistic. It is indeed the case that
salience tends to be higher in years where MPs are crit-
ical of ECB policy. However, as Figure 5 shows, the rela-
tionship between criticism and salience is by no means
linear. Firstly, and unsurprisingly, years with very little
activity can produce outliers (e.g., in 2005, where only
oneMP commented on the ECB, we have a perfect score
of −1). Causality may be reversed for those cases of very
low salience, in the sense that MPs who speak about an
issue that is not really on the agenda and that is not con-
sidered important at the time are likely to be those who
hold stronger views on the issue. Secondly, and more
problematically for the hypothesis, 2015 saw a compara-
tively high level of activity despite a slightly positive score
(0.05), as MPs became more reconciled with the ECB as
the Eurozone crisis abated. That said, the hypothesis has
become more relevant in recent years, as the AFD ac-
tively pushes the issue in debates and has also triggered
plenary debates (e.g., on the TARGET2 balance, in au-
tumn 2018).
Finally, having established that there is politicisation
in the form of increased salience and a generally critical
stance, the question is whether there is also increased
politicisation in terms of the numbers of actors involved
in parliament. Figure 6 shows that the number of MPs
Figure 5. Criticism of the ECB and salience.
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Figure 6. Number of MPs making ECB-related speeches per year. Note: 2009, 2013 and 2017 were election years.
who comment on ECB policies has indeed increased over
time, compared to the pre-crisis years. The exception is
again 2016 until autumn 2017, as the parliament tem-
porarily lost interest in the ECB. That said, the number
of MPs commenting on this issue is still quite small in re-
lation to the size of the Bundestag (currently 709 seats).
It is important to note, though, that several prominent
politicians made speeches about ECB policies during the
crisis, such as Lafontaine andWagenknecht for Die Linke,
Steinbrück and Steinmeier for the SPD, Kauder for the
CDU, Weidel for the AFD, Trittin for the Greens, and
Brüderle for the FDP. This may reflect the fact that the
topic is normally one that requires expertise, but that it
was also electorally salient as German voters were con-
cerned about the impact of low interest rates on their
savings, the stability of the Euro or the potential risks of
the ECB’s bond-buying programmes for Germany.
6. Conclusion
The ECB’s active role during the crisis did indeed come
at the cost of politicisation—at least temporarily. Thus,
the German parliament had traditionally been a strong
supporter of central bank independence, had only paid
limited attention to the ECBduring the financial crisis and
was generally quite positively disposed towards ECB poli-
cies. Many MPs praised the ECB for prioritizing stability
over growth, and criticisms were often disguised as po-
lite suggestions.
After 2009, the picture changed. Not only did the
Bundestag discuss ECB policies more actively, but it also
became more critical. Polite suggestions turned into
open criticism or even accusations, for example, that the
ECB illegally financed states and that its low interest pol-
icy expropriated savers. This change is surprising given
the Bundestag’s long tradition of restraint in its scrutiny
of Germany’s own central bank. Terms like ‘money press’,
‘expropriation’, ‘violation of the Treaties’, ‘illegal’, ‘mis-
guided’, and ‘flood of money’ became part of the vocab-
ulary. And when a movement created in this period en-
tered parliament in 2017, it revived this vocabulary after
a brief period of depolitisation. On the whole, we have
seen three waves of politicisation: the second and third
waves, in particular, brought high levels of polarisation
or criticism and greater levels of parliamentary activity
and a wider range of active MPs. While there is no clear
government-opposition divide in terms of the level of ac-
tivity, the criticism today mainly comes from opposition
parties, and especially from the far left and right.
Today, the MPs of the mainstream parties still fre-
quently repeat that ECB independence is an important
principle, but from the way they speak about these top-
ics, it is clear that trust in the ECB has eroded. A compari-
son with Högenauer and Howarth’s (2018) article on the
Bundestag and the Bundesbank also confirms that the
ECB is criticised frequently, whereas the Bundesbank is
virtually never criticised in parliament, and that the ECB
is discussed far more often than its national counterpart.
Independence clearly no longer protects the ECB from
criticism the way it protects the Bundesbank.
Interestingly, while the first two waves of politicisa-
tion were linked to prominent ECB decisions or policies,
the third wave is mainly linked to the changing German
political landscape after the 2017 elections. This third
wave of politicisation was ongoing as of early 2019, and
the effects of this politicisation will probably still be felt
for some time, given that a Eurosceptic party founded
on the back of a rejection of EU crisis policies has entered
parliament. In addition, the ECB’s new role as banking su-
pervisor means that it is likely to return to the spotlight
from time to time: As the ECB is facing a conflict of inter-
est in its role as both lender and supervisor, it will most
likely be closely watched each time a major bank is in cri-
sis. It does not appear that a return to depolitisation is
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likely in the near future, but the data also shows that de-
politicisation could happen in the right context. Whether
politicization will continue in the long-term will depend
both on the German political context and especially on
the future evolution of Eurosceptic parties, as well as on
the challenges the ECB will face in monetary policy and
banking supervision.
From a democratic perspective, this politicisation is
a challenge. It may be a good thing when politicisation
occurs in policy areas where increased scrutiny can lead
to better input into policies or a greater willingness to
hold actors accountable. But is controversy and criticism
fruitful in areas that are supposed to be relatively apo-
litical? And can a high degree of ECB independence still
be democratically justified, if the policy area ceases to be
technocratic and apolitical and turns into something that
becomes regularly politically contested?
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